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1 Introduction
The European Parliament (EP), directly elected by
the European people since 1979, is a unique insti-
tution in multiple ways. It is a parliament that is
at the same time powerful and powerless. Powerful
because of the wide (and expanding) range of in-
struments available to its members, and powerless
because of the low turnout among the citizens it is
precisely set up to represent. As the house of the
people, the Parliament is an arena where policy is
fought out. Because of the multiple overlapping jur-
isdictions that shape the relations between the con-
stituent parts of the European Union, however, it is
by no means clear who actually fights – and for what
reason. Are the members of the European Parlia-
ment (MEPs) ‘fighting’ in territorial or in ideological
groups? The central question driving this research is
How do ideology and nationality translate into the le-
gislative behaviour of members of the European Par-
liament?
The existing literature suggests that the answer
to this question is quite clear: it is ideology and
European partygroups that determine who fights
with and against whom. However, these partygroups
are by no means just another form of party – one of
the quintessential features of a party is that it is in
one way or the other able to nominate candidates
for office, yet the Europarties have to rely upon na-
tional parties to do so. This creates unclear loyalties
for MEPs. At the one hand, they need the Euro-
parties for positions of power within parliamentary
committees or delegations, but at the other hand,
they cannot do so without being elected, for which
they need their national parties. To complicate mat-
ters even further, elections to the European Parlia-
ment are mostly second-order elections where na-
tional topics, priorities, and interests dominate the
agenda of voters. At the very same time voters be-
come more and more critical of European integra-
tion. This brings up the question of how it can be
that national interests do not seem to translate into
the parliamentary behaviour of MEPs, as the exist-
ing literature suggests.
My argument why nationality might be more im-
portant than what we know now is twofold. First,
the existing research uses data and methodologies
which might very well produce erroneous informa-
tion. Second, because of a number of factors such
as the ever-larger number of member states, the fin-
ancial and economic crisis of 2008, and a renewed
focus upon the nation states’ importance for demo-
cratic legitimacy, the nationality of a MEP becomes
more important than his or her ideological position
in cooperating with other MEPs. Exactly because
most scholars argue that it is ideology that drives
the legislative behaviour of MEPs, the EP is a hard
case for my argument.
I will answer my research question by using data
on the fifth, sixth and seventh terms of the EP (re-
spectively from 1999 to 2004, 2004 to 2009, and
2009 up to halfway 2013) by examining who spon-
sors proposals with whom – a rather novel approach
in political science. As Louwerse and Otjes (2013,
p. 2) put it: "the study of parliamentary behaviour
should not only look at the final vote, but also at
the question who tables proposals and, specifically,
how MPs work together in tabling proposals". To
test whether ideology or nationality influences the
decision to work together, I will craft a number of
hypotheses. These hypotheses will be put to the test
by analysing dyadic data: all combinations of pairs
of two MEPs, where I have coded the number of
times the two MEPs have worked together (as a pro-
portion of the total number of proposals signed by
the first MEP), and a number of predictor variables.
The huge resulting dataset, containing well over two
million observations, is analysed through a logistic
regression and a binomial linear regression.
The main findings are that ‘geography’ increasingly
matters for the decision to work together. MEPs
from the same country now sponsor together more
than before (even when controlling for in- and de-
creases in the total number of proposals crafted), and
that ideology, conversely, is becoming less important.
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At the same time, cooperation between MEPs who
share one or more committees increases drastically,
suggesting that the EP might follow the same pat-
terns of specialisation as some scholars find for other
parliaments.
The structure of this paper is as follows: first, the
current findings on cooperation in the Parliament
will be discussed, followed by the limitations of these
findings. Second, an overview of the method of co-
sponsorship analysis will be discussed, followed by
the hypotheses, data, and research methods. The fi-
nal two sections provide the results and a discussion
thereof.
2 Explaining Cosponsorship in the
European Parliament
European integration theorists, most notably Ernst
B. Haas and Andrew Moravcsik, have divergent an-
swers to the question of how ideology and national-
ity translate into the legislative behaviour of MEPs.
Haas’ (1958, p. 16) argument is that European integ-
ration creates "loyalties, expectations and political
activities" that are shifted towards a "new centre"
– in other words, the European Parliament and the
partygroups demand (or just get) the loyalty of their
members. If this is the case, however, these loy-
alties are duly tested by the loyalties towards na-
tional parties and more-critical national electorates.
Moreover, crises like the economic and financial crisis
put stress on the relations between member states –
and therefore potentially also between the peoples of
these member states and their MEPs who cooperate
in partygroups. Moravcisk (1998, p. 18), by con-
trast, argues that it is not so much loyalties that
drive integration, but "a series of rational choices
made by national leaders". Changing one’s choice
seems much simpler than changing one’s loyalty, thus
when a crisis hits Europe, we could very well see a
shift in loyalties away from Europe back to the mem-
ber states.
Traditional explanations of the legislative behaviour
of MEPs have focussed on two strands of research:
first, that of socialisation and attitudes of MEPs
(e.g., Farrell and Scully, 2007), and second, on
the way MEPs vote (e.g., Hix, Noury, and Roland,
2007). The questions driving these research projects
is that of alignment: how do MEPs align, is it ac-
cording to national lines, or is it ideology? In other
words: when we want to predict (voting) behaviour
of members, should we then look at what country a
member is from, or should we look at the member’s
partygroup? Overwhelmingly, the answer seems to
be that, at least with regard to voting behaviour,
ideology is what drives the decision to vote in a
certain matter for or against a piece of legislation.
Members vote like their partygroup peers, not alike
their compatriots.
A number of scholars, however, have noted serious
problems with the approach of using voting data,
mainly focussing on problems of data selection (An-
deweg, 1995; Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug, 2009;
Faas, 2003). While the approach relying on inter-
views and surveys of MEPs indeed paints a very rich
picture, it lacks the possibility of a thorough analysis
of who works with whom. It is simply impossible to
ask all, or a representative sample of, MEPs with
whom they have worked together; if only because
of memory recall issues. A new way of investigat-
ing how and under what circumstances MEPs work
together is therefore needed.
Parliamentarians have multiple instruments at their
disposal to act through. Within the parliamentary
arena, the main options available are voting, talking,
and policy-making. The European Parliament is, in
multiple ways, unique in its sort: voting works un-
der a number of different rules of procedure: some
votes are taken according to a roll-call of which the
individual results might, or might not, end up in
the official records; other votes are by showing of
hands - which, obviously, are not recorded on the
level of the individual member. Speeches in parlia-
ment are even more diverse, because of the pleth-
ora of languages. Finally, policy-making is complex
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because of the shared, overlapping and distinct com-
petences of each of the institutions in the EU. Draft-
ing policy in the Union, from the perspective of the
EP, works through resolutions. When adopted, the
EP takes the stance as outlined in the resolution.
Some of these resolutions are technical in nature, for
example the proposing of a candidate for office or the
instigation of a new committee, while other resolu-
tions are drafted by one or more MEPs containing
a policy stance. Examples of such resolutions are
the EP adopting a position on what it regards as
violations of human rights, on issues stemming from
behaviour of members of the European Commission
(EC), or any other issue within the jurisdiction of
the European Union. In principle, these members
can propose policy alone, or recruit others to act as
cosignatories (though see the discussion on how free
MEPs are in proposing resolutions, in the respect-
ive section down below). Since members are free to
select cosponsors, looking at who signs with whom
provides valuable information for scholars interested
in understanding the (legislative) behaviour of par-
liamentarians. As Louwerse and Otjes succinctly put
it:
Most of what MPs vote on is proposed
by their colleagues. In presidential sys-
tems, most bills are tabled by MPs and
in parliamentary systems MPs propose mo-
tions, amendments, resolutions and legis-
lative initiatives. Therefore, the study of
parliamentary behaviour should not only
look at the final vote, but also at the ques-
tion who tables proposals and, specifically,
how MPs work together in tabling propos-
als. (2013, p. 2)
Selecting one or more cosignatories tells us, some-
what obviously, two things: first, that the draftee
wants to work together with the cosignatories, and
second, that the cosignatory wants to work with the
draftee (and any of the other signatories). Members
can select cosignatories on a number of grounds: be-
cause they agree (e.g., because they are closely posi-
tioned together on a relevant policy dimension, such
as the left-right scale), because they are from the
same partygroup or national political party, or be-
cause they are from the same member state. Other
factors might include that the signatories are both
in one or more committees together, or simply be-
cause they like each other. The main point here is
that cosponsorship conveys meaningful information
about the relation between different members.
The European Parliament is an especially interest-
ing parliament for this type of research. Instead of a
composition stemming from a single nation, it con-
tains elected officials from an ever-increasing num-
ber of member states, at the moment of writing
28. Various anti-European integration parties are
present within the EP itself as well as outside in
the member states. For this reason and others it
is counter-intuitive that cooperation is found to be
almost exclusively along ideological lines, and not
along national lines. Combining this intuition with
the aforementioned warnings on the use of roll-call
vote data stipulates the need to revisit the legislative
behaviour of MEPs.
The remainder of this section will discuss the find-
ings in the literature on legislative behaviour of
MEPs in general, the method of cosponsorship ana-
lysis and its application so far, and outlines my the-
ory by building several hypotheses.
2.1 Cooperation in the EP: what we know
thus far
As noted in the previous section, two main strands of
research on cooperation in the European Parliament
exist: one which is based on qualitative or survey-
based methods, and one which is based on quantit-
atively measuring parliamentary output. The latter
approach can be found in, among others, the works
of Brzinski (1995), Hix (2001, 0), Faas (2003), Hix,
Noury, and Roland (2007), Carrubba, Gabel, and
Hug (2008), Carrubba, Gabel, and Hug (2009), Hix
and Noury (2009) and Hug (2012). Most of these
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analyses concern an application of the NOMIN-
ATE procedure originally developed by Poole (2005);
Poole and Rosenthal (1984), and further expanded
by Carroll, Lewis, Lo, Poole, and Rosenthal (2009);
Poole, Lewis, Lo, and Carroll (2011). Qualitat-
ive and/or survey based research use a much wider
palette of methods and data sources, with as prime
examples Scully (2005), McElroy and Benoit (2007,
1), Farrell and Scully (2007) and Costello and Thom-
son (2010).
2.2 Limitations of current research on
roll-call votes
As Haas (1958, p. 16) famously lamented, "political
integration is the process whereby political actors in
several distinct national settings are persuaded to
shift their loyalties, expectations and political activ-
ities towards a new centre". Did, however, such
a shift occur? When contrasting the two bodies
of literature (the roll-call analyses, and the qualit-
ative/survey based analyses), one cannot forgo the
feeling of being at crossroads: does nationality play
an important role in the way in which MEPs operate
or not? Hix (2001, p. 663) concludes that "legislat-
ive behaviour is mainly along left-right-lines", and
that "transnational party group affiliation is more
important than national affiliation for determining
how MEPs vote". Yet, when asked directly, MEPs
see representing their partygroup as second least im-
portant task, ranking slightly higher than the low-
est ranking task, namely that of representing all the
people in the EU (Farrell and Scully, 2007, p. 105).
Representing the people of their respective member
states is deemed much more important, as is rep-
resenting the people who voted for their (national!)
party. Unless the preferences of all national parties
align perfectly within the EP’s partygroups (which
seems highly unlikely), something odd is at work.
Why do we not see such patterns in the voting beha-
viour of MEPs, given their priorities of representing
the peoples of their member states?
There are multiple responses to this question. It
could be that politicians preach their representative
roles, but at the end of the day prioritise differently.
It could also be that MEPs do actually give priority
to representing their national parties’ and member
states’ interests, but do so through other instruments
than voting. A more far reaching response would
be that the results found via the roll-call analyses
is simply biased towards finding more unity within
partygroups than in reality is the case. This con-
clusion is, however, far from new. Andeweg, writing
back in 1995 (p. 64–5), suspects that the cohesion in
party groups is "at least partly an artefact, caused
by the selection of data." Roll-calls can be called by
any party group or at least 32 MEPs (Faas, 2003,
p. 831). These roll-calls are requested, among other
reasons, to "keep a check on [partygroup] members’
participation in a vote" by the partygroup leadership
(Jacobs, Corbett, and Shackelton, 1992, p. 83–4).
Thus, Andeweg concludes, "[a]ny such analysis of
such roll-calls would seem to be biased to find party
cohesion." Even Hix (2001, p. 668), who uses EP
roll-call data extensively, writes that "the outcome
of these votes may be systematically biased".
Roger Scully excellently describes the schism in
which the European Parliament operates:
The European Union is the most far-
reaching attempt to address the biggest
problems that nationalism generates. At
one and the same time, the EU upholds the
centrality of nation-states within Europe,
yet also partially subverts that dominance
by establishing and developing institutions
of governance at a level beyond the state.
(2005, p. v)
and
In the case of the Parliament, whose mem-
bers are elected on a national basis, in
elections generally dominated by national
parties and in which national issues dom-
inate, and who once elected retain strong
links with national politics and particu-
larly their national party, the label inter-
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national is surely more accurate than either
of the conventional alternatives. (2005, p.
77)
Given the puzzle above, and that the EP is an in-
stitution "beyond the state", the obvious question
that springs into mind is whether or not the EP is
also beyond the nation? And does it thereby really
subvert the dominance by the nation-states? Scully
approaches this question from the angle of socialisa-
tion effects. He directly mentions roll-call analysis,
arguing that, "at best, voting analysis can give us
only limited insight into the intensity of individu-
als’ views; with only a few voting options ... we
cannot know whether an individual’s endorsement
means grudging support, modest enthusiasm or pas-
sionate conviction." (p. 15). This criticism seems
valid enough for voting, with its limited options; yet
does it hold for cosponsorship? Since picking co-
sponsors is a (moderately) free act, we can be more
certain that the draftees, at the very least, are mod-
estly enthusiastic about a bill. Such a new approach
to discover how and when MEPs cooperate is thus
more than welcome.
2.3 Cosponsorship in the literature
Looking at who proposes with whom is a somewhat
new approach to investigate the networks in which
parliamentarians, representatives and senators oper-
ate. The United States Congress has received the
most attention, with a number of different studies
on sponsorship (Fowler, 2006; Kessler and Kre-
hbiel, 1996; Koger, 2003; Talbert and Potoski,
2002; Wilson and Young, 1997). Other coun-
tries include The Netherlands (Louwerse and Otjes,
2013), Argentina (Alemán, Calvo, Jones, and Ka-
plan, 2009), and Chile (Crisp, Kanthak, and Lei-
jonhufvud, 2004).
The core finding of most of the aforementioned stud-
ies is that there is a high degree of overlap between
with whom legislators propose and with how sim-
ilar legislators vote, especially for "legislatures ... in
which parties are relatively weak" (Louwerse and
Otjes, 2013, p. 2). In other words: if a legis-
lator proposes with someone, these legislators are
also more likely than those who do not, or less often,
propose together, to vote both yea or both nay for
any bill. This is ideal for our case. Roll-call votes
cover about one-thirds of the total number of votes,
and these roll calls might not be representative of the
entire set of votes. If we have a second data source
and method which provides similar results to roll-
call analyses, yet covers a set of data which does not
suffer from the same selection effects, we can then
easily compare patterns of voting similarity with the
patterns of proposing together.
2.4 Hypotheses
In this section, I will develop four sets of hypo-
theses. The first relate to ideological explanations of
cosponsorship, the second relate to country-related
(territorial) explanations, including hypotheses re-
lated to the financial and economic crisis of 2008,
the third relate to mixed explanations such as party-
group membership. The main hypotheses are fo-
cussed on ideological and territorial explanations of
why a pair of MEPs work together. However, to
truly test for ideological and territorial explanations,
we should have more hypotheses on possible other
factors such as partygroup and committee member-
ship. It could be that some committees attract mem-
bers from specific countries whilst not from others,
and therefore without such a hypothesis we might
draw wrong conclusions about the original relation-
ship between territory and sponsoring together.1
2.4.1 Ideology
The decision to sponsor together is obviously (at
least in part) based on agreeing with what is actu-
ally in the proposal itself. Two MEPs who are on an
1Do see Achen (2005) for prudent advice on the risks and
prevention of garbage can models. I will come back to
choosing the right regression analysis methods and link
functions in methods section.
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ideological ordering closer together should therefore
be more likely to sponsor together. The basic as-
sumption of most ideological orderings is that they
are utility functions. This means that the further
away a proposal (or another MEP) is from the po-
sition of a MEP, the lower the value (utility) is of
sponsoring that proposal (see, for example, Poole,
2005, p. 48).
However, an ordering of parties or MEPs on one
single dimension (such as the ubiquitous left-right)
that subsumes all relevant and salient issues, is some-
thing that is hotly debated in the literature (e.g.
Benoit and Laver, 2006; Budge, Robertson, and
Hearl, 1987). A multidimensional ordering of MEPs
seems especially welcome since some proposals are
economic in nature (then an economic left-right or-
dering seems appropriate), while other topics might
deal with more or less integration into the European
Union (then a pro/anti Europe ordering seems ap-
propriate). Therefore, when I speak about ideo-
logical distance, multiple dimensions will be con-
sidered.
Bringing this together gives us a single hypothesis
on Ideological Proximity :
H1: Ideological Proximity Hypothesis: Two
MEPs who are ideologically closer will be
more likely to sponsor together more than
two MEPs who are ideologically further
apart.
2.4.2 Territorial Lines of Conflict
Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007, p. 4) find no import-
ant national dimension in terms of the voting beha-
viour of MEPs, something these authors ascribe to
the European Union’s system of devolution of powers
in a federal-like structure which allows decision mak-
ing relevant to the respective levels of government
(national, European) to stay at that level of govern-
ment. As noted in the section on limitations of roll-
call analyses, however, this finding might be the res-
ult of a bias in the selection (and the availability) of
the data; especially when contrasting this argument
with that of Farrell and Scully (2007, p. 105), sug-
gesting that national electorates are seen by MEPs as
more important than European partygroups. There
are a number of reasons why MEPs might decide
to ‘go national’ when picking cosponsors for resolu-
tions. It could be that MEPs use cosponsorship as
a signal towards voters, other MEPs or partygroups;
however, a much simpler explanation would be that
MEPs sponsor together with those colleagues that
speak the same language or have a similar political
style. For most MEPs, this means picking someone
with the same nationality. This leads to the hypo-
thesis Nationality :
H2: Nationality Hypothesis: Two MEPs
who are from the same European member
state will be more likely to sponsor together
more than two MEPs who are not from the
same member state.
Nationality is obviously not a magical device that
makes MEPs operate in a certain way. As sugges-
ted above, it could be that it works through simply
knowing your colleagues, or speaking the same (or
a similar) language. The chances of knowing each
other increase when the distance between the two
member states of the MEPs decrease. These insights
lead to the hypothesis Geographical Distance.
H3: Geographical Distance Hypothesis:
Two MEPs that are from member states
that are physically located closer by will
be more likely to sponsor together than two
MEPs who come from member states that
are further apart.
Territory does not necessarily equate with national
borders. MEPs from a specific group of countries
might work together often, while not with countries
outside that group. Groups can be drawn in the
European Union in an almost infinite number of con-
stellations.2 One reason why MEPs might be work-
2Unfortunately, the limits posed upon this paper make it im-
possible to explorer other groupings of countries, such as
former-Communist countries versus non-Communist coun-
tries. In this paper I have tried to select those groups
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ing together more frequently is because they have
done so before. Countries that have been in the
EU for a longer time might have created support-
ing networks of cooperation between member states.
The founding EU 6 countries have known each other
longest, so the chances of MEPs from those coun-
tries working together are highest. This leads to the
hypothesis Early Joiners.
H4: Early Joiners Hypothesis: Two MEPs
who are both from EU 6 countries will be
more likely to sponsor together more than
two MEPs who are not both from EU 6
countries.
The financial and economic crisis of 2008 weighs
heavily on Europe. A number of European member
states have been forced to cut down public spend-
ing, and, at the same time, the more aﬄuent mem-
ber states are asked to (partially) pay for the in-
solvable debts of the less-well-of member states. As
a consequence, those latter states demand unpre-
cedented powers over the national budgets of the
former states, leading some scholars to argue that
the nation-state is under "assault" (e.g. Baudet,
2012, p. 81). Therefore, politicians might very
well opt for less cooperation in party families and
more in national or regional groups: MEPs from one
member-state voting as a block against MEPs of an-
other member-state; or, of MEPs from more aﬄu-
ent European regions versus MEPs from the poorer
regions. The academic literature seems to support
this story: Claessens (2009, p. 263) speaks of "fiscal
nationalism" when he describes state responses to
the crisis. The economic crisis of 2008 hit Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain hard, very derog-
atorily subsumed under the acronym PIIGS.3 This
that seem likely to have the highest chance of significantly
sponsoring more together.
3See, however, Quiggin (2012, p. 229), writing about the
PIIGS: "The real problem came when this analysis was
extended to the rest of the heavily indebted periphery –
commonly referred to in such accounts as the PIGS (Por-
tugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain) group. Ireland was some-
times thrown in as a second ‘I’. This was unfair and in-
accurate, particularly as regards Spain and Ireland, which
had been running budget surpluses in the years leading up
to the crisis." [...THUS WE IGNORE QUIGGIN]
might create incentives for MEPs who are both from
PIIGS countries to work together.
There are a number of possible causal explanations
why MEPs from hard-hit countries would work to-
gether. They could simply try to form a block
against the richer countries, either out of policy pref-
erences (forming a block to prevent measures im-
peding their economies even further), or out of new-
found solidarity. The crisis could thus prompt a cul-
ture of solidarity in which the MEPs work together,
not necessarily because they agree on exact policy
terms, but because they share the same problems.
This leads to the hypothesis Economic Crisis Solid-
arity.
H5: 2008 Economic Crisis Solidarity Hy-
pothesis: Two MEPs who both come from
PIIGS countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, or Spain) will sponsor together
more after the 2008 economic crisis than
two MEPs from that same set of countries
before the 2008 economic crisis.
Not only the hard-hit countries might see more (or
less) cooperation, also all Eurozone countries might.
The creation of a banking union and the mere con-
sequences of the economic crisis stimulate MEPs
from the Eurozone countries to work together more
– more in comparison to non-Eurozone MEPs and
more in comparison over time.This leads to the hy-
pothesis Both in Eurozone.
H6: Both in Eurozone: Two MEPs who are
both from countries in the Eurozone will
sponsor together more than MEPs who are
not both from Eurozone countries.
2.4.3 Mixed: principals & agents
Next to purely ideological and purely territorial lines
of conflict, there are a number of mixed explanations
of two MEPs sponsoring together. Consider MEPs
that are more likely to sponsor together because they
are in the same European party group: is this a case
of ideology (they are often ideologically positioned
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closer together than two MEPs who are not both
from the same party), or of some other effect such
as the partygroup exerting influence on two MEPs
to sponsor together? Or, it could be that sponsoring
together more while being in the same partygroup
is a mixed effect of knowing each other and being
ideologically close. The idea that partygroups act
as principals towards its MEPs as agents is propag-
ated by Hix (2002): he argues that MEPs are un-
der the influence of (at least) two principals: the
partygroup, for positions of power, and the national
party for nomination at election time. Although the
exact causal mechanism is something to investigate
further, there are thus good reasons to assume that
two MEPs from the same partygroup would spon-
sor together more often, than two MEPs who are in
different partygroups. This leads to the hypothesis
Same Partygroup.
H7: Same Partygroup Hypothesis: Two
MEPs who share the same partygroup will
sponsor together more than two MEPs who
do not share the same partygroup.
A second mixed option is that of the same national
party. National parties are important because they
are necessary for nomination, without a national
party, a MEP cannot be placed on the voting ballot.
National parties might stimulate that their MEPs
cooperate more - it might increase the bargaining
power of the national party versus the European
partygroup, or versus other national parties – within
or outside of the partygroup. Another effect can
be that which I noted earlier on in the discussion
on territorial lines of conflict. Two MEPs from the
same country share the same political culture (and
the same political socialisation process), and will
know each other for a longer time than most MEPs
that are not nominated by the same national party;
furthermore, since they are from the same national
party, they are ideology-wise probably also closer by
than two MEPs who are not from the same national
party. This leads to the hypothesis Same National
Party.
H8: Same National Party Hypothesis: Two
MEPs who are both nominated by the same
national parties will sponsor together more
than MEPs who are nominated by different
national parties.
A final mixed option is that of shared commit-
tees. With the number of parliamentarians, and
the sheer amount of work coming at them across
a wide range of topics, specialisation is key to mak-
ing the work load manageable. This specialisation
will therefore probably lead to two MEPs who share
one or more committee to propose together more of-
ten. For the Dutch parliament, Louwerse and Otjes
(2013) find exactly this specialisation effect. At one
end, committee-based cosponsoring can be seen as
expressing an ideological position: partygroups are
probably likely to select and to invest costly time
in those committees that are relevant for their con-
stituents. A green party will probably select those
committees and invest a good deal of time in them, if
they are about environmental issues. Since all party-
groups will work on this basis, some ideological con-
vergence will be happen in the selection of candid-
ates for a particular committees – thus these MEPs,
for ideological reasons, might cooperate more. How-
ever, since most partygroups send MEPs to most
committees, this effect is probably small. This sug-
gests that when MEPs cooperate because they share
one or more committee, this truly is an effect of spe-
cialisation rather than ideology. This leads to the
hypothesis Sharing Committees.
H9: Sharing Committees Hypothesis: Two
MEPs who share more committees will
sponsor together more than two MEPs who
share less, or no, committees.
The next section will discuss the data sources and
provide an overview of the statistics for all of the
variables.
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3 Data
The data used for the analysis of cosponsorship is
that of all publicly available resolutions on the web-
site of the European Parliament. The data ranges
from 1999 (start fifth EP term) up to June 6, 2013
(midway seventh EP term). A special computer pro-
gram has been developed, first, to extract all the res-
olutions from the Parliament’s website,and second,
to interpret the documents so that they are uni-
formly coded into a dataset. Finally, a third module
extracts the sponsors from the raw text of the res-
olution. This module uses a coarse matching tech-
nique to allow for spelling differences (and mistakes
on the part of the Parliament’s archival service). To
ensure coding reliability, the programme gives an in-
dication of the expected number of sponsors (based
on word counts), and gives a matching reliability
score. This latter measure can be seen as a confid-
ence interval for coding names which are not exactly
match (e.g., "Michels" instead of "Mitchels"). All
unreliable cases were hand-coded (around 90 names
on about 40 proposals). A final check consisted of
randomly selecting a sample of resolutions and com-
paring human interpretation with that of the com-
puter.
The computer program used for the extraction of the
data has specifically for this paper been developed by
the author. It uses Perl-compatible regular expres-
sion ("preg") to extract information from the raw
HTML files, which is then entered into a PostgreSQL
database. The name-matching algorithms used are
the Trigram and Unaccent modules ("pg_trgm",
"unaccent"), and for distance calculation the data-
base uses the extension Earth Distance (which uses
the Great Circle Distance equations to calculate the
distance between the capitals of the member states
of any two MEPs; modules "cube" and "earthdis-
tance"). The data will be released upon publication
of this paper via the author’s website, under a Cre-
ative Commons license.4
4See http://www.harmen.net/.
3.1 The selection of resolutions
The European Parliament operates under different
rules of procedure (following, for example, treaty
changes or the Union’s enlargement). Some resol-
utions are inherently useless for cosponsorship ana-
lysis. Examples of such useless resolutions are tech-
nical resolutions forming a new committee, or resol-
utions which are proposed by a committee (without
explicitly mentioning the names of MEPs). Such res-
olutions are not included in the creation of the dy-
adic cosponsorship dataset. Also, since the composi-
tion of the EP changes drastically after elections, the
most relevant patterns will be found between MEPs
in one single EP term.5
The resulting data sets are big. Since we are inter-
ested in patterns of cosponsorship (and not of spon-
sorship), the dataset (one for each EP term) consists
of dyadic relationships. For each combination of two
MEPs, the following data is available: the total num-
ber of proposals sponsored by the first MEP, the
number of these proposals which are also sponsored
by the second MEP, a collection of dummy variables
(e.g., same country, same partygroup, same national
party), and a number of interval-ratio independent
variables (e.g., the distance between the left-right
positions of the MEPs, the number of committees in
which both MEPs take part).
3.2 Operationalisation of the dependent
variable
The dependent variable for most analyses will be the
proportion of resolutions of the first MEP that are
also sponsored by the second MEP.6 The logistic re-
5Note, though, that an analysis of the persistence of cooper-
ation between incumbent MEPs would also be interesting,
for example to discover long-term socialisation effects (un-
fortunately, this is out of the scope of this paper).
6An example might be of help. Consider the following fic-
titious dyad: the first MEP is Mrs. Johnson (who has
sponsored a total of 160 bills), the second MEP is Mr.
Christian (who was on a bill together with Mrs. Johnson
for 20 times). The proportion is thus 20/160, or 12.5%. It
is important to understand that the (reverse) proportion,
that of Mr. Christian to Mrs. Johnson, is not necessarily
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Table 1: Overview of the dependent variables
Dependent variable Statistic EP 5 EP 6 EP 7 *
Count cosponsoring mean 0,1122 0,1572 0,0992
standard deviation (0,8384) (1,4546) (1,1766)
% of MEPs cosponsoring at least once 5,30% 5,32% 4,10%
mean when cosponsoring at least once 2,1164 2,9531 2,4215
standard deviation (3,0027) (5,6128) (5,3072)
Proportion cosponsoring mean 0,0090 0,0084 0,0122
standard deviation (0,0624) (0,0608) (0,0828)
For EP 7, the data on cosponsorship is up to June 7, 2013.
Table 2: Example of the dyadic data
Dyad (MEP 1 - MEP 2) proportion cosponsoring same country same partygroup L-R distance
Brie - Adamou 6 / 114 no yes 1,22
Brie - Alvaro 3 / 114 yes no 4,91
Anastase - Zimmerling 0 / 3 no yes 0,86
(etc.) .. .. .. ..
The data are just for illustratory purposes. Proportion cosponsoring consists of the number of resolutions
signed by both MEP 1 and MEP 2, divided by the total number of resolutions signed by MEP 1.
gression uses a dummy variable, which is coded as
1 when the two MEPs in the dyad have ever co-
sponsored (one or more) proposals together. For the
binomial regression analysis, the dependent variable
is an odds ratio vector, consisting of the number of
proposals sponsored together to the total number of
proposals of the first MEP which are not sponsored
by the second MEP. In the respective sections, I will
discuss the dependent variables a bit more.
3.3 Operationalisation of the independent
variables
For the independent variables, a combination of self-
coding and external sources have been used. For
the ideological distance, the positions for MEPs are
coded as follows. First, the database created by
Döring and Manow (2012) has been imported, by
linking the MEPs national party’s position on the
left-right, state-market, liberty-authority, and pro-
anti EU integration to the each MEP. This allows
the same. It could very well be that Mr. Christian has pro-
posed much more than Mrs. Johnson – leading to a lower
proportion. See table 2 for a more advanced example.
a comparatively fine-grained positioning of MEPs,
even within one single European partygroup (obvi-
ously, however, not within each national party). The
absolute difference between the position of the first
and the second MEP is calculated, giving the close-
ness of the two MEPs. Because of the high number
of (small) national parties, however, time-series data
on the position of each party is not readily available.
Therefore, the parties’ ideological scores are taken
from the year 2006 (or as close to this year as pos-
sible).7 The dummy variable same country, same
partygroup, same national party, and same com-
mittee are based on my own calculations, using a
number of sources: my own coding, the website of
the European Parliament (EP 7 from mid-2012 on-
wards), the data of Hix, Noury, and Roland (2007)
(some information for EP 6), Hoyland, Sircar, and
Hix (2009) (information on EP 1-5, some informa-
tion on EP 6 and 7). Table 3 provides an overview
7For parties established after 2006, the first year for which
position data is available is selected. I realise that treating
parties as having fixed positions is suboptimal. However,
the results in practice will probably not be affected greatly:
a move to the right by a right-wing party will be balanced
by a move to the left by a left-wing party.
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Table 3: Overview of independent indicators
hypothesis operationalisation data source range
Ideological proximity left-right, state-market, liberty-authority,
anti/pro EU
Döring and Manow
(2012) 1 - 10
Nationality names member states match own comparison 0 or 1
Geographical distance distance between capitals own calculation 0 - ∞
Political culture political-cultural region match own assertation 0 or 1
Early joiners Both in EU 6/9/10/12/15/25/27 own comparison 0 or 1
Same partygroup partygroups’ unique IDs match own comparison 0 or 1
Same national party national parties’ unique IDs match own comparison 0 or 1
Committees shared count committees’ unique IDs shared own calculation 0 - ∞
Economic crisis both names member states is in PIIGS own comparison 0 or 1
of the dependent variables per hypothesis.
3.4 An overview of the data
Table 4 provides an interview of the data.What is im-
mediately clear from this table is that a lot of MEPs
have never sponsored together; only about five per-
cent of all the combinations of two MEPs have ever
(during the parliamentary term) sponsored a pro-
posal together. Combining this information with
table 4 on the number of resolutions, tells us that
on average, each MEP sponsors about ten proposals.
This leads us to expect that MEPs are very select-
ive in the decision with whom to cosponsor (and it
is my theory that this decision is far from random,
as outlined in the section on the hypotheses). What
is more is that the standard deviation of sponsoring
at least once together is quite high, this is probably
an effect of the fact that some MEPs hardly sponsor
any proposals at all. This observation is backed up
by the standard deviation of the average number of
useful resolutions signed per MEP.
4 Methods
To answer the hypotheses stated in the preceding
sections, two types of analyses will be carried out.
Since about 95% of the MEPs, on average, have
never worked together, predicting when MEPs work
together is interesting. A dichotomous variable (has
worked together during EP term / has not worked to-
gether) allows for a logistic regression analysis. The
central question here is what are the predictors for
cosponsoring a proposal?
The data, however, is richer and thus allows for a
more precise estimation. Linear regression analysis
is the method of choice, yet ordinary least squares
regression would yield unreliable results because of
the type of and distribution of the data. The dyadic
cosponsorship proportion (by definition) cannot be
normally distributed; instead, the distribution ap-
proaches a (negative) binomial distribution. There-
fore, I will employ regression analysis for such a dis-
tribution. The central question here is why do some
MEPs cooperate more than others?
5 Results
This section provides the results of two separate ana-
lyses, answering two distinct questions. First, why
do MEPs opt to work together in the first place? Is
it because of ideological motivations (i.e., agreeing
on policy), or is it because of national or regional
motivations (e.g., because of knowing other MEPs
from your member state, or because of defending
your national interests)? Second, some MEPs work
together often while others done so once or twice.
What explains working together more?
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Table 4: Overview of the data: general statistics
Category Statistic EP 5 EP 6 EP 7 *
MEPs total 696 941 824
Countries total 15 27 27
Committees total 40 26 22
average # per MEP 4.94 3.60 2.65
std. dev. (2.34) (1.48) (.85)
Delegations total 73 49 40
average # per MEP 3.41 3.30 2.56
std. dev. (2.21) (1.72) (.85)
National parties total 167 227 232
average size in seats 4.17 4.15 3.55
std. dev. (6.51) (5.96) (5.0)
Partygroups total 10 10 8
average size in seats 102.1 127.4 105.3
std. dev. (97.2) (118.8) (95.2)
Resolutions total 1874 2769 2239
# useful for cosponsorship analysis 1492 2375 1564
total signatories 9201 13728 7995
# signatories for useful resolutions 6824 12841 7429
avg. number of signatories per useful resolution 4.57 5.41 4.75
(4.48) (5.9) (5.01)
avg. number of useful resolutions signed per MEP 9.80 13.65 9.02
(17.67) (32.83) (17.77)
Dyads number of observations 483720 884540 678152
For EP 7, the data on MEPs and resolutions is up to June 7, 2013; the data on committees and
delegations is up to November 26. 2011.
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5.1 Working together
The results of the logistic regression for the depend-
ent variable has worked together at least once are
shown in table 5. A number of things are interest-
ing from this table: the pseudo-R² is rather low for
the first two terms of the European Parliament, but
suddenly increases in the last EP, apparently caused
by the sudden influence of the variable same party-
group. The R² should be interpreted with great care,
if only because any R² is not too valuable in terms of
the information it provides for the model fit, and in
this particular case because this is not an OLS but a
logistic regression, so we deal here with a pseudo-R²,
complicating things even further. Garry King gives
prudent advice:
A high R² is considered to be proof that the
correct model has been specified or that the
theory being tested is correct. A higher R²
in one model is taken to mean that that
model is better. All these interpretations
are wrong. R² is a measure of the spread
of points around a regression line, and it is
a poor measure of even that (...) (1986, p.
676)
The next page contains table 5, showing the results
for the logistic regression analysis.
5.1.1 The decline of ideology?
Even more interesting than the effect of being in the
same partygroup is the role of ideology – or rather,
the lack of the role of ideology. All three measures
of ideological proximity (i.e., how close two MEPs
are on an ideological ordering of the national parties
that nominated them) are significant and pointing
in the right direction in the first EP term under in-
vestigation (EP 5: 1999-2004): a one-point increase
of the distance between two legislators translates
into a 5 percent lower chance of ever sponsoring to-
gether. With the exception of the distance on the
anti-pro European integration dimension, however,
the effects become more sporadic in the latter two
parliamentary terms. The direction of the left-right
distance indicator suddenly becomes positive: this
means that the further apart two legislators are, the
higher the chances of working together; the most
likely explanation for this is a technical one, since
ideological distance, same partygroup, and same na-
tional party are slightly correlated. Also, the left-
right distance is no longer significant for the last EP
term. A prediction simulation, in which a hypothet-
ical pair of two MEPs who are at the same ideological
point (with a distance of 0) on all three dimensions
is compared with a pair of two MEPs who are in all
respects albeit ideological distance the same (with a
distance of the theoretical maximum of 10 points on
all three ideology indicators), confirms this pattern.8
For the last EP, the mean chance of ever sponsoring
together increases from 2.222 to 2.321 percent; how-
ever, this result is not significant (for p < 0.05). The
effect of a pair of MEPs being theoretically furthest
apart is significant for the fifth and sixth EP, with
the chances of sponsoring together for the fifth EP
lowering from 5.3 to 3.634%; and for the sixth EP,
the chances of sponsoring together lower from 6.311
to 2.059%. These results are robust, even when con-
trolling for within-country variance.9
The figures noted above paint an interesting picture
for the role of ideology in the decision to cospon-
sor together. Ideology appears to be a rather large
factor in the decision to cosponsor together, but only
for the fifth and sixth EP terms. Ideology appears to
become less relevant over the EP terms: the chances
of working together are less or not affected for the
sixth and seventh EP, in contrast to the fifth. My
ideology hypothesis can thus simultaneously be con-
firmed for EP 5 and 6, but rejected for EP 7.
8Note that all simulation prediction runs were conducted in
R 2.15.2 with the package Zelig (version 3.5.4). Attention
is spend to make sure that the expected values, the first
difference in expected values, and the risk plots take on
the shape of a normal distribution.
9This means that the percentages, and more importantly,
the changes therein, are about the same both when the
pair of MEPs are from the same country, as for pairs of
MEPs of two different countries.
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5.1.2 Territorial lines matter (now more)
So far for the results when predicting working
together through ideological proximity. Another,
somewhat competing, set of explanatory factors
relates to territory, or, in other words: where you
stand depends on where you sit, to coin Miles’ (1978)
Law.
Judging from table 5, MEPs from the same coun-
try have a much higher chance of working together,
and the further apart the two capitals of the mem-
ber states of the MEPs are, the lower the chances
of working together. Rather unexpectedly, MEPs
who both come from the founding father countries
of the EU (the ‘EU 6’), have a lower chance of work-
ing together. Simulation prediction shows that the
chances of working together when from the same
country increase significantly for all EP terms: from
4.723 percent (when not from the same country) to
5.787 percent (when from the same country), for EP
5; from 4.667 to 6.868 percent, for EP 6; and finally,
from 2.148 to 3.825 percent, for EP 7. The last few
numbers can be summarised as: the country origins
of MEPs matter, and increasingly do so – the hypo-
thesis is therefore accepted. Note that I will discuss
the relative changes down below.
The geographical distance hypothesis suggests that
territory in the very literal sense of the word might
matter. When MEPs are from countries that are
geographically close, they should thus have a higher
chance of working together. Note that in table 5
the effect sizes are rounded off. This does not mean
that the effect is necessarily small: the small coeffi-
cients are mostly an effect of the measurement of geo-
graphical distance (in kilometres). A one-kilometre
increase obviously does not affect the chances of co-
operating highly; yet a three thousand kilometre in-
crease might. Another set of prediction simulations
was run, contrasting those who are geographically
at the same point (distance of 0 kilometre)10 with
10One might think that because of setting a distance of 0
kilometres, I introduce a problem of comparing those who
are from the same country with those who are not. This,
those who are at the empirical maximum distance
of about 3300 kilometres.11 That is, those latter
groups are from MEPs that have capitals furthest
apart. The results of the simulation collaborate this
story, by showing significant results for all three EP
terms: for EP 5, the chances of sponsoring together
drop from 6.474 to 2.688 percent; for EP 6 from 5.45
to 3.817 percent; and finally for EP 7, from 2.317
to 2.095 percent. Apparently, geographical distance
becomes less of a factor over different EP terms, yet
we can accept the hypothesis.
The final hypothesis on territorial explanations of
sponsoring together is the Early Joiners Hypothesis.
I have argued that working together might be ex-
plained through being both in the founding EU coun-
tries. These countries, in all likelihood, have the
strongest ties because of having worked together for
a long time (and all having agreed to form some-
thing new, instead of ‘just’ joining the already exist-
ing institutions of the European Union). The negat-
ive coefficients, however, suggest otherwise – namely
exactly the opposite effect. When MEPs both come
from one of the EU 6 countries, they have a lower
chance of working together. The prediction simula-
tion turns out that this effect is significant for all
three EP terms: from 4.943 to 4.514 percent for EP
5; from 4.943 to 4.052 percent, for EP 6; and for EP
7, from 2.27 to 2.032 percent. The hypothesis is thus
rejected.
however, is not the case: the variable same country is kept
constant by the simulation model. Simulations run with
hypothetical cases, after all.
11Note that the empirical maximum distance increases
between EP 5 and EP 6 to about 3700 kilometres, because
of the European Union’s enlargement.
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Table 5: Logistic regression: model & results
EP 5 EP 6 EP 7 *
Predictor B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B)
(Intercept) -2.7310 0.0279 0.065 *** -3.0220 0.0187 0.049 *** -4.5090 0.0312 0.011 ***
Left-right distance (0-10) -0.0391 0.0066 0.962 *** 0.0100 0.0041 1.010 * 0.0084 0.0072 1.008
Liberty-authority distance (0-10) -0.0550 0.0061 0.946 *** -0.0019 0.0034 0.998 0.0173 0.0053 1.017 **
Anti-pro EU distance (0-10) -0.0224 0.0036 0.978 *** -0.0476 0.0024 0.954 *** -0.0215 0.0042 0.979 ***
Geographical distance (KM) -0.0003 0.0000 1.000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 1.000 *** 0.0000 0.0000 1.000 **
Same country (no/yes) 0.2163 0.0281 1.241 *** 0.4102 0.0227 1.507 *** 0.5943 0.0339 1.812 ***
Both in Eurozone (no/yes) 0.1997 0.0186 1.221 *** 0.2832 0.0129 1.327 *** -0.0449 0.0166 0.956 **
Both from EU 6 countries (no/yes) -0.0944 0.0200 0.910 *** -0.2078 0.0174 0.812 *** -0.1137 0.0232 0.892 ***
Both from same partygroup (no/yes) 0.1653 0.0194 1.180 *** -0.0098 0.0142 0.990 2.4670 0.0211 11.789 ***
Both from same national party (no/yes) -0.0078 0.0423 0.992 0.1353 0.0387 1.145 *** 0.1218 0.0417 1.130 **
Number of committees shared 0.2255 0.0052 1.253 *** 0.2891 0.0038 1.335 *** 0.5169 0.0089 1.677 ***
Adj. McFadden’s Pseudo- R2 0.024 0.023 0.174
Significance: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. For EP 7, the data on cosponsorship is up to June 7, 2013.16
The 2008 financial and economic crisis: sudden
solidarity? The results for the Eurozone hypothesis
indicate that working together between the MEPs
from the Eurozone countries is lower for the last EP
term in comparison with the two before. There are
seemingly good reasons for MEPs to cooperate less:
when your nation’s political leader is portrayed as
Hitler in demonstrations in another European coun-
try (as was the case for German Chancellor Angela
Merkel in a demonstration in Portugal, see for ex-
ample De Volkskrant, 2012), you might want to skip
that country’s MEPs when looking for cosponsors for
your proposal.
However, the crisis of the Euro and in the Eurozone
might also stimulate countries to work together. Es-
pecially MEPs from those countries that were hard-
est hit, needing emergency loans from the IMF or
European institutions, might want to work together.
Either out of sheer solidarity, or out of the need
to form a block against other countries to prevent
European policy that affects the hard-hit countries
gravely. This, in short, is the 2008 Economic Crisis
Solidarity Hypothesis. To test this hypothesis, a
second set of logistic regression analyses have been
run with all the indicators of table 5, but now aug-
mented with the variable Both come from PIIGS
countries. The (all-significant) exponent-B figures
range from 1.339 for EP 5, 1.079 for EP 6, to 0.851
for the last EP, suggesting that cooperation between
these countries is on a steady decline in the period
1999-2013. The prediction simulation confirms this:
chances of cooperating for EP 5 increase from 4.647
to 6.129 percent, for EP 6 from 4.771 to 5.125 per-
cent, and for EP 7 down from 2.252 to 1.924 per-
cent.
These results suggest that cooperation suffers under
economic stress. Instead of solidarity, countries opt
to work less together. This rejects my solidarity hy-
pothesis.
5.1.3 Mixed predictors: partygroup membership
Four of the hypotheses are of a mixed type: not
purely ideology, but also not purely territorial di-
viding lines. The same partygroup hypothesis ex-
presses an element of ideology (because being in a
partygroup together signals agreement on at least
some basic political tenants of policy), yet a left-
leaning Christian Democrat (EPP) might, on ideo-
logical terms, be much closer to a member of the
European Socialist group (PES). Furthermore, be-
ing in a partygroup together and sponsoring to-
gether might just be an effect of knowing each other
– hardly an ideological motivation. A minor ele-
ment of territory is at work in some partygroups
as well – broad and large groups such as the So-
cialists or Christian Democrats have members from
most of the member states, while smaller groups such
as the Greens have members from a lower number of
member states (and those member states with Green
MEPs are not randomly distributed over Europe:
they are mainly in Western Europe). The same
national party hypothesis is both ideological, territ-
orial, and stemming from socialisation: to begin with
the latter, MEPs from the same national party ob-
viously have a good chance of knowing each other
well. Being in the same national party means that
you are from the member state; while the ideolo-
gical spread between the national party’s members
should be lower than the spread among the more
heterogeneous partygroups. The sharing committees
hypothesis, as discussed in the previous section, has
a minor element of ideology and no clear element
of territory in it; yet working together more might
just be the result of knowing each other, or of spe-
cialisation. Finally, the both in Eurozone hypothesis
suggests that Eurozone members have a common in-
terest because of sharing a currency.
First up is the same partygroup hypothesis. Look-
ing at table 5 paints a somewhat hard-to-interpret
picture. Whereas being together in a partygroup in-
creases the chances of two MEPs to work together
for the fifth (from 4.6232 to 5.408 percent) and sev-
17
enth EP (from 1.259 to 13.06 percent), it does not
significantly do so in the sixth EP (down from 4.8 to
4.756 percent, still not significant). The enormous
increase in the chances of working together is also
the likely reason for the increase in the pseudo-R² of
the logit model for the seventh EP. What explains
this sudden increase is as of yet unknown: further
research is needed to explain this big increase. The
hypothesis is therefore accepted for the fifth and sev-
enth EP, but rejected for the sixth.
The hypothesis on sharing the same national party
does not significantly explain patterns of cosponsor-
ship for the fifth EP, but does do so for the sixth
and seventh EP. The chances of cooperation for the
fifth EP decrease (from 4.821 to 4.779 percent, non-
significant), and increase for the sixth EP (from
4.782 to 5.443 percent), as well as for the seventh
EP (from 2.227 to 2.507 percent). This shows that
sharing the same national party has an effect, but
this effect is not significant for all three EP terms
under investigation, nor can we speak of an increas-
ing role over time of sharing the same national party
for predicting cooperation in the Parliament. The
hypothesis can thus be accepted for the last two EP
terms, but not for the first.
Sharing committees has a significant effect in all
three EP terms, and the increase in the exponent B
values suggest that sharing committees increasingly
heightens the chances of working together over time.
A prediction simulation, comparing those who share
no committees with those who share the lowest em-
pirical maximum of all three EP terms, namely shar-
ing nine committees, collaborates this story: where
the chances of working together in the fifth EP in-
crease from 4.051 to 24.323 percent, for the sixth
EP from 4.053 to 36.242 percent, and for the seventh
EP from 1.88 to 66.744 percent. These increases look
very big (and they actually are), but do keep in mind
that almost no pair of MEPs share nine committees:
these percentages are the results from a simulation
after all. See the interpretation of these figures in the
concluding paragraph of this section for their mean-
ing. In short, we can accept the hypothesis that
says that sharing committees has a positive effect on
the chances of cooperating, and that over time the
effect gets bigger: (sharing) committees appears to
become more relevant for predicting cooperation in
Parliament over time.
Table 5 suggests that two MEPs coming both from
countries in the Eurozone have, significantly, a
higher chance of working together for the fifth (from
4.278 to 5.172 percent) and sixth EP (from 4.334
to 5.674 percent), but actually have a lower chance
of working together in the seventh EP (down from
2.274 to 2.175 percent). One could argue that this
lowering in working together is a result of the strains
put on countries during the economic crisis; leading
to less cooperation. Yet, one could conversely argue
that the strain put on these countries forces MEPs
to work more together (since they have a clear com-
mon goal: saving the Eurozone or –at least– pre-
venting economic turmoil as much as possible). I
could have introduced these two explanations as hy-
potheses, however, I feel that more theoretical un-
derpinning is necessary for this – which is out of the
scope of this paper. If I had these hypotheses in-
cluded, clearly, the former would win: namely that
Eurozone MEPs now work less together. An inter-
ested scholar might want to work with these insights.
One other explanation, namely that of the expansion
of the Eurozone from the eleven initial countries in
1999 to seventeen in 2011, can on theoretical grounds
be ruled out: if the expansion of the Eurozone with
specific countries (for which cooperation with the ex-
isting members of the Eurozone might be lower for
factors not directly related to the adoption of the
Euro) were to be the explanatory factor, we would
have seen the cooperation between Eurozone mem-
bers drop in the sixth EP, compared with the fifth
EP. This would be the case since most of these new
adopts have adopted the Euro during the sixth EP
term. There is no such drop, however. The hypo-
thesis of cooperation because of shared membership
in the Eurozone is therefore accepted for the fifth
and sixth EP, but rejected for the seventh.
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Table 6: Logistic regression: prediction simulation
EP 5 EP 6 EP 7 *
chances chances chances
Predictor change ref. sim. change ref. sim. change ref. sim.
Ideology prox.: 0/10 -31% 5.3 3.634 -67% 6.311 2.059 +4% 2.222 2.321
D: Same country: 0/1 +23% 4.723 5.787 +47% 4.667 6.868 +78% 2.148 3.825
Geogr. distance: 0/3300 -58% 6.474 2.688 -30% 5.45 3.817 -10% 2.317 2.095
D: both EU6: 0/1 -9% 4.943 4.514 -18% 4.943 4.052 -10% 2.27 2.032
D: same PG: 0/1 +17% 4.623 5.408 -1% 4.8 4.756 +937% 1.259 13.06
D: same nat. party: 0/1 -1% 4.821 4.779 +14% 4.782 5.443 +13% 2.227 2.507
Committees shared: 0/9 +500% 4.051 24.323 +794% 4.053 36.242 +3450% 1.88 66.744
D: both Eurozone: 0/1 +21% 4.278 5.172 +31% 4.334 5.674 -4% 2.274 2.175
D: both PIIGS: 0/1 +32% 4.647 6.129 +7% 4.771 5.125 -15% 2.252 1.924
The values after the indicators denote the values for the reference category and the test category, re-
spectively. The column ’ref.’ and ’sim.’ give the chances of cosponsoring when, cetris paribus, the
independent variable listed is changed to the respective value; the column ’change’ gives the percentage
changes between the two. For EP 7, the data on cosponsorship is up to June 7, 2013.
5.1.4 Comparing changes in chances
If we want to say anything about the change over
time of the impact for each of the independent vari-
ables, we should look at the change in chances. An
example might help: say we want to know if the in-
fluence of ideology has changed between EP terms.
What we know from the discussion in the preced-
ing section is that for the fifth EP, the chances of
working together are lower when the first MEP is as
far apart from the second MEP as possible (i.e. they
have an ideological distance of 10 points), when com-
pared to two MEPs who are as close as possible as
they can (i.e. an ideological distance of 0). The over-
all chance of working together drops from 5.3 to 3.6
percent. One could dismiss this as a small decrease
(it is after all only 2.3 percentage points) – however,
this equals a 31% lower chance of working together.
The reason that the percentage point changes are so
small is because cooperation is a rare act in Parlia-
ment. If we repeat the calculation trick for the sixth
EP, we find that the chances decrease by 67%. This
means that ideology now has a bigger effect on the
average chance of working together than before.
Table 6 shows all the changes. It is important to
understand that one can only compare horizontally
(i.e. between EP terms for the same independent
variable, so not between independent variables – one
should use table 5 for that). Furthermore, it is also
important to understand that for all non-dummy
variables, the simulation value is set to the theor-
etical or empirical maximum. Thus, for the variable
committees shared for EP 7, the chances of work-
ing together increase enormously (by 3450 percent)
– but this is only because the empirical maximum
number of committees shared is nine. In practice,
almost nobody shares nine committees. For this
reason (and others) one should not compare inde-
pendent variables from this table. What one can
conclude, however, is that the number of commit-
tees shared increases the chances of sponsoring to-
gether when comparing EP terms over time. In other
words: committees become much more important in
predicting working together.
The main conclusions we can draw from table 6 are
the following:
1. Ideology: Ideological proximity is a good ex-
planatory factor for cooperation in the fifth
and even more so in the sixth EP, yet does
not explain significantly the cooperation in the
seventh EP. This suggests that ideological has
ceased to be an important factor in the decision
to cosponsor together. When two or more au-
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thors appear together on a resolution in the
European Parliament, this is not because they
are on ideological terms close to each other.
2. Territory: Territorial proximity significantly
contributes to explaining patterns of cooper-
ation in all of the investigated EP terms.
Moreover, the chances of cooperating when from
the same country increase quite considerably
over time: apparently, MEPs revert to choos-
ing a colleague from their same member states
now more than before. At the same time, geo-
graphical distance explains less, meaning that if
and when MEPs do cooperate across European
borders, they do so irrespective of how far the
country of the other MEP is located. The in-
crease in the influence of sharing the same na-
tional party corroborates this story.
3. Partygroups: The pattern for cooperation with
MEPs from the same partygroup is erratic.
While the chances increase in EP 5, they de-
crease in EP 6; but only to increase very drastic-
ally in the seventh EP.
4. Committees: The influence of the number of
shared committees becomes bigger over time.
This suggests that, as Parliament gets bigger
and/or it gets more tasks and responsibilities,
MEPs specialise more.
5. Old Boys Network: Cooperation between the
founding fathers of the EU, the original six
countries that formed the Union’s predecessor,
is lower than between other EU 6 and non-EU
6 countries. If there is such a thing as a Europe
of multiple speeds, there is apparently not one
in which EU 6 countries form an inner group –
or any group whatsoever.
6. Euro Crisis: The Eurocrisis appears to have a
negative effect on cooperation across MEPs who
are both from Eurozone countries. In the fifth
and sixth EP, in essence those before the Euro-
crisis of 2008, cooperation is on the increase;
yet after the onset of the crisis, there actually
is less cooperation. The idea that there is a
kind of solidarity between "PIIGS" countries,
whether because out of pure solidarity or shared
policy preferences, seems untenable. Chances of
cooperation between MEPs of these five coun-
tries is positive, meaning that MEPs cooperate
more, but this cooperation is on the decline and
for the seventh EP, the chances of cooperation
lower quite remarkably with 15 percent.
5.2 Why do some MEPs work more
together?
The decision to cosponsor together at least once can
be because of a relatively random factor, such as
running into each other in the elevator. Such events
are hard to capture in a (regression) model. There-
fore, a more fine-grained analysis helps to uncover
what factors influence the decision to cosponsor to-
gether more than once. If the same strong effects are
found as in the previous logistic regression analyses,
then this strengthens the arguments posed in the
hypotheses. Predicting the number of occurrences
of proposals sponsored together seems like a job for
a simple ordinary least squares regression, however,
such a model does not incorporate a number of prob-
lems when using the dyadic data. An OLS regression
might predict values of less than zero (so that not
only two MEPs have not worked together, but they
have negatively worked together – nice in theory, im-
possible in practice), or values higher than one (so
that the two MEPs have sponsored more propos-
als together than they have put signatures under all
of their proposals, evidently also impossible). Fur-
thermore, the inherent heteroskedastic nature of pro-
portional data invalidates the assumptions on which
OLS models rely.12 A generalised linear binomial
regression model, on the other hand, is specifically
designed to work with this type of data (see for an ex-
cellent discussion of using binomial regression Craw-
ley, 2007, pp. 569-91); since such a model uses a
12This is true because the variance near the two asymptotes
(0;1) necessarily approximates, and at the extremes equals,
zero.
20
Table 7: Binomial regression: changes in the number of resolutions cosponsored
predictor range EP 5 EP 6 EP 7 *
(Intercept) 0 - 1 -99% -99% -100%
Left-right distance 0 - 10 -3% -1% +1.76%
Liberty-authority distance 0 - 10 -5% -1% +.75%
Anti-pro EU distance 0 - 10 -2% -4% +1.60%
Geographical distance 0 - ~3700 KM -% -% -%
Same country no/yes +35.84% +36.86% +41.22%
Both in Eurozone no/yes +26.26% +15.93% (+1.96%)
Both from EU 6 countries no/yes -15% -15% -19%
Both from same partygroup no/yes +219.62% +119.46% +2952.50%
Both from same national party no/yes -21% +45.71% +70.64%
Number of committees shared 0 - ~16 +28.00% +35.70% +72.09%
* For EP 7, the data is up to June 7, 2013.
The percentages denote the increase of the dependent variable for a one-unite increase of the independent
variable. A value between brackets is not significant (p < .05).
logit link, the predictor estimates are in terms of the
log of the dependent variable. The dependent vari-
able is alike an odds ratio: the number of times two
MEPs have cosponsored to the number of times they
have not.13 Interpreting the unlogged estimators is
in terms of the number of proposals cosponsored:
the model automatically takes care of the variance
in the total number of resolutions signed.
What can we conclude from table 8? For easy inter-
pretation, I have provided table 7, in which the per-
centages are given: the percentages express the per-
cent of resolutions cosponsored when the independ-
ent variable increases with one unit; for a dummy
variable that equals to being from the same party-
group, country, etcetera. The conclusions drawn in
the previous section (on the incidence of cosponsor-
ing) more or less hold. A higher ideological dis-
tance significantly lowers the number of proposals
sponsored together for MEPs in the fifth EP; but
this effect flattens out in the sixth EP, and actually
reverses in the seventh EP, in MEPs with a higher
13Another example might be of help. Consider the same ficti-
tious dyad as before: the first MEP is Mrs. Johnson (who
has sponsored a total of 160 bills), the second MEP is Mr.
Christian (who was on a bill together with Mrs. Johnson
for 20 times). The odds ratio is thus 20 to (160-20=140),
or 1 to 7. In other words, for the twenty proposals co-
sponsored, the first MEP has 140 proposals written which
are not sponsored by the second MEP.
ideological distance sponsor together more. One in-
teresting observation is that the distance on the anti-
pro European integration dimension for the sixth
EP influences the number of proposals sponsored to-
gether quite strongly. This might be the result of the
uprising of new populist parties just before and dur-
ing this EP term (2004-2009). Being both from the
same country still significantly and highly heightens
the number of proposals sponsored together, while
cooperation between MEPs from Eurozone mem-
ber countries decreases steadily, and cooperation
between MEPs from the founding EU 6 countries is
quite steadily negatively affecting the number of pro-
posals sponsored together. The most spectacular fig-
ures are for MEPs from the same partygroup: when
two MEPs are from the same partygroup, they spon-
sor more together – a lot more. Also, the number
of committees shared between the two MEPs stead-
ily increases the number of proposals sponsored to-
gether. This, as noted in the previous section, seems
to hint at the increasing importance of committees
and thus specialisation.
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Table 8: Binomial regression: model & results
EP 5 EP 6 EP 7 *
Predictor B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B) B SE Exp(B)
Left-right distance (0-10) -0.0337 0.0045 0.967 *** -0.0112 0.0024 0.989 *** 0.0175 0.0049 1.018 ***
Liberty-authority distance (0-10) -0.0489 0.0040 0.952 *** -0.0136 0.0021 0.986 *** 0.0075 0.0035 1.008 *
Anti-pro EU distance (0-10) -0.0249 0.0027 0.975 *** -0.0396 0.0016 0.961 *** 0.0159 0.0028 1.016 ***
Geographical distance (KM) -0.0002 0.0000 1.000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 1.000 *** -0.0001 0.0000 1.000 ***
Same country (no/yes) 0.3063 0.0196 1.358 *** 0.3138 0.0135 1.369 *** 0.3451 0.0213 1.412 ***
Both in Eurozone (no/yes) 0.2332 0.0130 1.263 *** 0.1478 0.0077 1.159 *** 0.0194 0.0108 1.020 n.s.
Both from EU 6 countries (no/yes) -0.1679 0.0135 0.845 *** -0.1656 0.0102 0.847 *** -0.2059 0.0149 0.814 ***
Both from same partygroup (no/yes) 1.1620 0.0123 3.196 *** 0.7860 0.0078 2.195 *** 3.4185 0.0154 30.525 ***
Both from same national party (no/yes) -0.2305 0.0276 0.794 *** 0.3764 0.0192 1.457 *** 0.5344 0.0239 1.706 ***
Number of committees shared 0.2469 0.0034 1.280 *** 0.3053 0.0020 1.357 *** 0.5428 0.0054 1.721 ***
Significance: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. For EP 7, the data on cosponsorship is up to June 7, 2013.
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5.3 Between incidence and structural
cooperation
It is important to grasp the difference between the
two sets of analyses carried out. The first set consists
of logistic regression analyses, predicting any cospon-
soring, while the second set consists of binomial re-
gression analyses, predicting the number of proposals
cosponsored. A very large share of MEPs never co-
sponsor, and a second share sponsors only once; at
the same time, when MEPs sponsor together, they
do so a lot more than once. This suggests that
there might be different mechanisms at work in the
decision to cosponsor. For example, a partygroup
might stimulate cosponsoring between its members
– these members might do so once to satisfy their
partygroup leadership, but decline to do so more of-
ten for various reasons (such as not being from the
same member state, ideological distance, not shar-
ing any committees). Such considerations validate
the need for comparing two separate analyses.
In general, the differences between the incidence and
the structural cooperation seem small. Some of the
interesting differences can be found for the dummy
variable same country. Whereas the logistic regres-
sion found quite a higher chance of cooperating, and
this chance increases over the three EP terms under
investigation, the effects for the structural coopera-
tion are more stable. Yes, the number of proposals
sponsored together is quite much higher when two
MEPs are from the same country, but the increase
in the importance of being from the same country
increases much less. This suggests that MEPs incid-
entally sponsor together with their fellow country-
men more, but there are smaller changes over time
as it comes to structural cooperation. The reverse
holds for cooperation between two MEPs who share
the same national party: they do not cooperate of-
ten, but when they do, they do so together now more
often than before.
6 Discussion & Conclusions
Does cooperation between members of the European
Parliament follow ideological or territorial lines? As
always, a simple answer to this question does not
exist. This paper has identified a number of inter-
esting patterns and trends. It is most certainly not
purely ideology that drives the decision to work to-
gether: "I agree with him thus I work with him" does
not hold. "I am from the same country as she" ap-
pears to be an increasing factor in determining with
whom a MEP cosponsors a resolution; at the same
time geographical distance becomes less important.
This seems contradictory but it does not have to be:
although cooperation is now more across MEPs from
the same country, when MEPs do cooperate across
borders, it less relevant that the MEP is from an ad-
jacent country. To summarise: nationhood becomes
more important, and ideology less so.
The most striking differences between when compar-
ing MEPs across the last three EP terms is that
committees, and even more so, partygroups, mat-
ter. Coming from the same partygroup greatly in-
creases the chances and the number of times MEPs
cooperate. At the same time, there is no evid-
ence that there is such a thing as an inner group
of countries (consisting of the group of founding
EU 6 countries), moreover, the cooperation between
MEPs from these countries is actually lower than
between other MEPs.
The Eurocrisis appears to have an effect on how
and with whom MEPs cooperate with each other.
The countries hard hit by the financial and economic
crisis of 2008 and onwards now cooperate (much) less
than before the crisis; as is the case for cooperation
within the Eurozone at large. European integration
theorists, such as Haas (1958) argue that integra-
tion itself creates a new self-supporting core which
attracts allegiance from its component members. My
research suggests that this allegiance is less enduring
than Haas predicted. It could be that extreme exo-
genous shocks, such as the 2008 crisis, create serious
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doubts on how solid the allegiance of MEPs toward
the EU is.
Does it in itself matter that ideology becomes less
important and national borders become more im-
portant? There are two levels at which this question
can be answered. From a scientific point of view, the
(renewed?) importance of nationhood brings about
difficult questions for integration theorists working
from a functionalist spill-over perspective. It could
be that the Eurocrisis also brings about a new period
of Euro sclerosis. Such an observation would stretch,
if now surpass, the findings of this paper – how-
ever, this paper does point out to some important
problems of true European integration. The second
level at which this question can be answered – al-
beit without an answer in this paper: is it good that
the European Parliament appears to operate along
national borders, instead of along a single European
border?
The European Union now more than ever has to deal
with serious challenges. The financial and economic
crisis is one of them; a number of scholars observe a
renewed surge of nationalism in the way that mem-
ber states deal with economic hardship. Bernitz and
Ringe (2010), for example, discuss and warn for the
nationalistic economic policies which are designed to
favour national economies, rather than the (or an)
European economy. Such policies traverse through
the legislative institutions of the European Union, as
this paper has demonstrated. Since economic integ-
ration is at the core of the European project, a return
to national policies will be a threat for the entire
project, as Bernitz and Ringe, among others such
as Claessens (2009), observe. Schiek (2012) sees the
crisis as a critical juncture for European integration.
This paper provides some (admittedly: provisional)
evidence for this theory. The way in which MEPs
operate indeed has changed remarkably. However,
Europe underwent multiple crises – and has survived
by integrating even further as Kühnhardt (2011) ob-
serves in his discussion on the effects of major crises
on European integration (a solution also proposed
by a number of other economists, such Nowotny,
Mooslechner, and Ritzberger-Grünwald, 2011). One
only has to think of the Empty Chair crisis in 1965,
the British rebate in 1984, the economic crisis of
the late 1980s, and more recent, the crises invoked
by the rejection of the European Constitution mid-
2000 by popular referenda in France and The Neth-
erlands. Yet, the European project is still here, so
the question is how serious a threat the current eco-
nomic crisis is. A path for further research on this
project is to investigate how MEPs behaved before,
during, and after the other crises mentioned. Is a de-
crease of ideology and an increase of national lines
of conflict a common reaction to crises, to surge at
a point and to reverse after the end of a crisis? If
it is not, then the return to national lines of con-
flict might signal important problems for Europe as
a union. As Kühnhardt (2011) argues, the com-
mon response to European crises is more integra-
tion, which is a challenge for politicians considering
the rise of Euroscepticism among the electorates (Ar-
ató and Kaniok, 2009; Hooghe and Marks, 2007).
Furthermore, if not even those who are strongly so-
cialised in European institutions (cf. Haas, 1958)
promote integration and behave in unison, then who
would?
6.1 Further research
There are a number of points for further research.
One obvious (and admittedly: somewhat cheap) sug-
gestion is to increase the time span of this research
by including all resolutions from the first EP term
onwards. This allows for more variation over time
and thus any pattern that is found that exists over
all or a large share of EP terms becomes more solid.
This allows for other (financial) crises, such as in
the 1980s, to be included in the analysis; it could be
that the patterns I have discovered are not new but
happen on all influential crises in the EU.
Another point of departure is radically altering the
strategy, without altering the core question of the
paper: how do MEPs group? That is leaving the-
oretical expectations aside and just focussing upon
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the data there is. What are the ‘inner circles’ of each
MEP? Are they for some MEPs across nations while
for others across ideological lines?
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